At this inflection point, Europe cannot afford any deadlock in Germany.

On Sunday, Germans will vote in one of the most decisive elections in recent history. With Germany’s economy in its second year of a recession, the transatlantic alliance looking shakier than ever, and Russia closing in on all but winning its war in Ukraine and upending the European security order, all eyes are on the next government in Berlin. After the unpopular center-left coalition of Olaf Scholz imploded late last year over budget infighting, the conservative Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) is guaranteed to win by a wide margin. And yet it is anything but guaranteed how party chairman Friedrich Merz can govern a country in which the far-right Alternative for Germany comes second, polarization hits record levels, and parliamentary fragmentation inhibits coalition-building.

At this inflection point, Europe cannot afford any deadlock in Germany.

On the eve of this major vote, we’re offering an authoritative guide to the players and parties involved—as well as gaming out the various scenarios facing Germany’s coalition-builders.

The key players in Germany

After a heated leadership contest contributed to the CDU/CSU’s defeat in 2021, the center-right party alliance anointed Merz as Spitzenkandidat, or lead candidate, early on. Despite missteps under Merz, support for the CDU/CSU has remained stable at around 30 percent, which is a five-point increase from 2021. His controversial move to break a long-standing taboo and leverage the AfD’s votes in the Bundestag to pass a resolution on stricter migration policies has not harmed the conservatives in the polls and could embolden them as they begin coalition negotiations with Scholz’s center-left SPD or the Greens under Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck. The controversial shift away from Angela Merkel’s centrist positions to embrace tougher stances on immigration, climate change, and social security seems to pay off.

The SPD is expected to record the worst result in its history and give the boot to Scholz, who led them to a surprise victory in 2021. The first three-party coalition under Scholz started with an ambitious agenda to reform the country after sixteen years of Merkel. Three months in, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine put a swift end to their policy objectives. Over the past three years, Scholz shepherded Germany through the largest security crisis since World War II. He declared the Zeitenwende in Germany’s foreign and defense policy, addressed soaring energy prices, and marshaled support for Ukraine. His critics say that he did too little, too late. On the home stretch, Scholz tried once again to frame himself as a level-headed peace chancellor to appeal to concerned, famously status-quo voters. Ultimately, he ran an anti-Merz, anti-AfD campaign without developing a clear affirmative message of what he stands for. Should the SPD end up with around 15 percent, it will probably mean the end of Scholz’s political career. Familiar faces are lining up in the background, including Boris Pistorius, the popular defense minister.

The Green Party, a product of the 1970s environmental and peace movements, has changed radically against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. Under Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerback, the Greens became the staunchest advocates for more military aid to Ukraine and a more hawkish China policy. Climate policy has taken a backseat but, ironically, has become a stumbling stone for Habeck’s ambitions to become the party’s first chancellor. Many voters still blame him for a deeply unpopular, badly crafted residential heating regulation. At 13 percent, roughly the same as in 2021, Habeck can be content if he holds on to his seat.

Voters widely blame the liberal to libertarian FDP for the government’s disastrous end. Multiple news agencies reported that the party secretly planned to provoke an exit from the coalition long before Scholz threw them out over their unwillingness to compromise on the budget. The FDP still is a one-man show built around its charismatic chairman and former minister of finance, Christian Lindner. During the campaign, he sought to distance himself from the traffic-light coalition and moved the FDP hard to the right on social issues, such as migration. Still, Merz will think twice about forming a coalition with the FDP after it broke off negotiations in 2017 and undermined the Scholz government from within. That is if the party defies the polls and makes it past the 5 percent threshold to secure seats in the next parliament.

The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is expected to double its 2021 election results and become the largest opposition party at around 20 percent—a turning point in a country that took immense pride in coming to terms with its Nazi past and keeping the far-right small. The AfD’s campaign has been marred in controversy over shady donations, linkages to Chinese and Russian security services, and support from Elon Musk and J.D. Vance. Not without irony for a xenophobic, anti-woke party, Alice Weidel, the AfD’s lead candidate, is a lesbian economist residing in Switzerland with her Sri Lanka-born partner and spent six years in China. She will likely continue to chair her party and seek to build bridges to other far-right European parties that have so far shunned the AfD for its extremism. All major German parties are disavowing a coalition with the AfD in an effort to uphold the postwar cordon sanitaire.

In a surprise comeback, the Left Party is predicted to return to the Bundestag after its most illustrious politician, Sahra Wagenknecht, formed a new party and named it after herself, the Coalition Sahra Wagenknecht, BSW. After initially polling around 10 percent, the BSW has since plummeted and is unlikely to cross the five percent threshold.

Given Germany’s complex voting system and the threshold, how many parties make it into the Bundestag will directly influence what percentage of the vote will translate into what share of the seats they receive and therefore which majorities and coalitions are mathematically possible.

While Germans don’t vote for their chancellor directly, pollsters have long asked who they’d prefer at the helm of the next government if they could vote for a candidate. On the eve of the election, there seems to be limited excitement about any of the Spitzenkandidaten. Merz leads with 34 percent over Scholz’s 26 percent, closely followed by Habeck at 25 percent and Weidel at 19 percent. When asked about the next coalition government, 35 percent prefer a CDU-led government over 17 percent who support the SPD to retain the chancellory. 11 percent and 9 percent of voters would respectively like to see the AfD and the Greens in the driver’s seat.

Color-coding coalitions

Germany reformed its complex electoral system to counter the trend toward an ever-larger Bundestag. Each voter still has two votes, one for a district candidate, and the second for a party. But the Bundestag now has a fixed size of 630 representatives whose mandates are allocated proportionally to the second vote share of all parties that have met the 5 percent threshold or won at least three electoral districts. Whereas in 2021, any candidate who won the first vote in a district had a guaranteed seat in parliament, those who are in close races must hope that their party is entitled to as many direct mandates according to the proportional vote, or they will not make the cut.

According to the most recent polling, the center-right CDU/CSU (221 seats) and far-right AfD (150 seats) together would hold a clear majority in the next Bundestag. As Merz precluded a coalition with the far-right, two alternatives remain: a not-so-Grand Coalition with the SPD (335 seats) or the smallest winning coalition with the Greens (317 seats). If either the FDP or BSW make it into parliament, a more stable two-party coalition could be potentially ruled out and the country would face another three-way experiment—or its first-ever minority government. What is clear, however, is that German voters want to exclude the option of another center-left coalition. Except for the scenario in which no coalition can be formed, Merz will be the next chancellor.

In Germany’s multi-party system, political chromatics go far beyond the United States’ red and blue. Coalition constellations are usually designated by nicknames, abbreviations, or country flags corresponding to the colors assigned to German parties.

Here’s a breakdown of the various scenarios and their possible implications.

The not-so-Grand Coalition

Coalition partners: CDU/CSU, SPD

Majority: A small but still comfortable majority of around twenty seats.

Center of gravity: Modestly center-right, given the CDU/CSU’s proportional vote share.

Dynamics: Tested at the federal and state levels, the Grand Coalition is the most common and probably most unpopular combination between the two parties. Preferred by the CDU/CSU, the last time a Grand Coalition governed Germany was during Merkel’s last term from 2017-2021. The SPD would be the undeniable junior partner and serve Merz as a steppingstone for a tough course on migration, economy, and climate policy. Probably the only option for Scholz to stay in power, as he could return to the Ministry of Finance where he last served under Merkel and take responsibility away from the CDU/CSU for reforming the problematic debt brake that led to the dissolution of his own government and inhibits investments in defense and the economy. More of a coalition for domestic policy than foreign policy, as there are more differences between the parties.

Stumbling blocks: Is the SPD willing to hand back the keys to the chancellory after only one term, which was cut short? Besides pride, some Social Democrats might want to reconstitute the party outside of government. A defeat of Scholz could see renewed infighting between the SPD’s centrist and progressive wings and efforts to shift the party further to the left, which would make a coalition with the CDU/CSU difficult on social and fiscal issues.

Probability: The most likely and most desired outcome by CDU/CSU and SPD.

The view from Brussels: Merz is a convinced European and promised to restore Germany’s standing with its neighbors, especially France and Poland. Under Scholz, relations with Paris, Warsaw, and Brussels became icy. They will be relieved to see him go and hope that the SPD does not take any ministries that touch on core issues facing the European Union, including the ministries of defense, economic affairs, and finance.

The view from Washington: Previous administrations criticized Germany’s grand coalitions for cozying up to Russia and China to promote trade and energy dependency (remember Nord-Stream II?). The CDU/CSU and SPD have a history of putting the country’s big business interests ahead of its security concerns. Whether this will apply after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will remain to be seen, but would it really meet with opposition from the Trump White House?

Black and Green: The coalition of the hawks

Coalition partners: CDU/CSU, Greens

Majority: By the (almost) smallest possible majority of two seats

Center of gravity: Center-right with some progressive social and environmental policies

Dynamics: Tested successfully in more liberal-minded states in Northern Germany, a coalition with the Greens is deeply unpopular among the more traditionally conservative voices in the CDU and particularly the Bavarian CSU. Having the Greens as part of the coalition could give Merz political cover to pass policies he sees as necessary but knows are contested at the party’s base, including reforming the debt brake, investing in the energy transition for industry, and strengthening the EU. There is alignment between Merz and the Greens on a tougher foreign and security policy, but deep rifts in terms of domestic policy need to be bridged.

Stumbling blocks: The Greens will oppose Merz’s strong course against migration and climate change, two issues that hit close to home for them. Conservatives like Merz will be reluctant to compromise and risk ceding more ground to the AfD. Differences on agricultural policy are less publicized but no less controversial.

The view from Brussels: Merz’s strong support for the EU would be breaking down open doors with the Greens. He promised to put an end to the infamous “German vote,” to closely engage France and Poland, and to promote “EU-only” free trade agreements. In a speech to CSU members ahead of the Munich Security Conference, he argued that the EU must develop into a defense union and previously indicated his openness to common defense borrowing. Greens would support that enthusiastically. Disagreement could arise over migration and the common agricultural policy.

The view from Washington: Before Vice President Vance’s speech in Munich, Merz was one of the most vocal advocates for a pragmatic approach to Washington and faced conflict with the outspoken Greens. Since then, he has toned down his optimism. Still, the United States would deal with a government that is more hawkish on China, Russia, and Iran, and open to invest in the Bundeswehr. Washington would have to deal with some internal coalition disputes over the question of whether foreign and security policy should be interest- or value-driven. Greens would certainly be more outspoken and critical of Trump’s policies.

The centrist Kenya Coalition

Coalition partners: CDU/CSU, SPD, and Greens

Majority: A clear but necessary majority of 100 seats if either the FDP or the BSW makes it to the new Bundestag.

Center of gravity: Quite literally an attempt to hold the center

Dynamics: This is the Hail Mary option to govern with a democratic majority in a highly fragmented Bundestag. But a new three-party coalition would strain the parties’ willingness to compromise and the public’s patience. The limited scope for policy away from the center would play into the hands of partly anti-democratic parties on the right and left fringes. Everyone is aware of the risk and would pursue distinct policies to appease their base. Pushback from the other camps would be inevitable. It is difficult to imagine how such a coalition could survive long-term and not fall victim to the same conflicts that plagued the traffic light coalition.

Stumbling blocks: The SPD and the Greens want to drive Merz to the left. This is hard to imagine for Merz who built his platform criticizing Merkel’s centrist course. Then again, it is probably his only chance to realize the long-held dream of becoming chancellor.

The view from Brussels: Under Merz as chancellor, there would be more clarity for Germany’s neighbors. All three parties are deeply committed to the EU and there is a good chance that the Greens would hold on to the Foreign Ministry. This could prove important in easing concerns in Eastern Europe that relations with Russia could return to business as usual once the war in Ukraine is over. Instability in the coalition could further complicate Germany’s position in the EU and see the European Commission increasingly take the lead.

The view from Washington: A strong mandate for Merz would see Germany reclaim its leadership role in Europe. Washington would welcome a pragmatic, conservative, and business-oriented chancellor. A stable coalition could also lead to a more assertive Germany and Europe, willing to draw clear red lines. Merz, who has sometimes portrayed himself as “Trump light,” is also increasingly expressing his irritation with the U.S. president’s course. The SPD and the Greens would certainly welcome a stronger distancing.

What to watch on election night…

A complex picture will emerge with the first reliable projections coming in just after polling station close on Sunday at 6 pm CET (noon EST). The most important questions, in order: how many parties will cross the threshold to make it into the new Bundestag? Can the CDU/CSU form a stable two-way coalition with either the SPD or the Greens? How strongly will the AfD perform?

Anyone hoping for greater political stability in Germany will want to see fewer parties making it into parliament. The CDU/CSU, AfD, SPD, Greens, and Left Party are all but guaranteed to return for another season, while the FDP and BSW will have to hold their breath until election night. Only when both get the boot will Merz be able to form a stable two-way coalition. Otherwise, we will probably see prolonged negotiations and possibly the country’s first minority government or, more likely, new elections. Given current geopolitical dynamics, the consequences for Europe would be disastrous.

…and in the days and weeks to follow

A weak showing for the SPD or the Greens would likely upend the remarkable intra-party peace between progressive and centrist factions in both parties. Left-wing voices, disciplined in the traffic light coalition to work with the FDP, would demand a clearer left-leaning profile and thereby throw a wrench in the works of coalition negotiations to form a Merz-led government. Merz will simultaneously have to deal with the Bavarian sister-party CSU. Its chairman Markus Söder, who is also Bavaria’s state-premier and an ever-hopeful to become the CDU/CSU lead candidate, has made no secret of his ambition to position the CSU to take over key ministries in Berlin.

Depending on the outcome, many political careers may falter. If the SPD underperforms around 15 percent (almost 26 percent in 2021) or falls behind the Greens, it will mean the end of Scholz’s role in national politics. Boris Pistorius or Lars Klingbeil, the charismatic party leader, could replace him. After many commentators blamed Annalena Baerbock for the Greens’ poor showing in 2021, Habeck may have to line up behind the foreign minister again if he fares much worse. Voices in the FDP are going to call on Christian Lindner, the notorious troublemaker of the traffic light coalition, to step down and be replaced with Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmerman, the chairwoman of the European Parliament’s defense committee.

Not directly related to the outcome of the election, but some optimistic observers hope that by Monday, politics will be set aside to announce cross-party, and potentially European-wide, support for a comprehensive aid package to Ukraine.

About the authors: Jorn Fleck and James Batchik

Jorn Fleck is the Senior Director of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Centre.

James Batchik is an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.

Image: DesignRage / Shutterstock.com

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